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Cigarette Warnings:
The Perils of the Cipollone Decision
W Kip Viscusi*
In Cipollone v Liggett Group, Inc., a splintered Court concluded that
cigarette smokers who are injured through their consumption of tobacco
may bring some state law tort claims against the manufacturers of the
cigarettes. Other claims, however, are preempted by federal legislation
requiring cigarette packages and advertising to bear warning labels, the
specific wording of which is dictated by statute. After a detailed examina-
tion of the economics of hazard warning systems, Professor Viscusi argues
that the most important economic issues in the Cipollone case were cor-
rectly resolved in Justice Stevens'plurality opinion, which contained little
overt economic reasoning. The other two opinions in the case, which con-
tained more economic analysis than the Stevens opinion, reached conclu-
sions that were economically less sound with respect to the most important
warnings issues. Professor Viscusi concludes that the result in Cipollone is
largely good news for consumers, and that it should serve as a warning
against judging the economic effects ofjudicial decisions by the degree to
which they seem to rely on economic reasoning.
I. INTRODUCION
Cigarettes have long been among the most prominent of risky
products. The hazards of smoking have been an object of public debate
for decades, if not for centuries. The first warning language specifically
mandated by Congress for consumer products was for cigarettes, and
the experience with cigarette warnings has provided a natural experi-
George G. Allen Professor of Economics; Duke University.
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ment that has served as a model in a variety of other contexts, such as
alcoholic beverages. In the context of tort liability, cigarettes have
assumed a conspicuous role not only because of the enormous stakes
involved in cigarette litigation, but also because the risks are so well
known.' In its Restatement (Second) of Torts, the American Law Insti-
tute used the risks of cigarettes as a prime example of familiar hazards:
The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which
would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it,
with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its
characteristics. Good whiskey is not unreasonably dangerous
merely because it will make some people drunk, and is especially
dangerous to alcoholics; but bad whiskey, containing a dangerous
amount of fusel oil, is unreasonably dangerous. Good tobacco is not
unreasonably dangerous merely because the effects of smoking may
be harmful; but tobacco containing something like marijuana may
be unreasonably dangerous. 2
Notwithstanding the often-voiced belief that the risks of smoking
are a subject of common knowledge within the American community,
our legal system has not yet clearly determined how those risks are to
be allocated. An important step, however, was recently taken by the
Supreme Court in Cipollone v Liggett Group, Inc. 3 Because this case
will have widespread ramifications not only for cigarettes but for warn-
ings policies more generallythe economics of the decision are worth
examining and evaluating in some detail.
By the time it reached the Supreme Court, the Cipollone case had
generated a very complex procedural history. For our purposes here,
only a few aspects of that history are important. After a New Jersey
I In addition to the discussion of cigarettes in the Restatement (Second) of
Torts (ALI, 1965), and inEnterprise Responsibilityfor Personal Injury-Reporter's
Study (ALI, 1991) ("ALI Reporter's Study"), a variety of articles have been
concerned with the legal status of cigarettes. See, for example, Paul G. Crist
and John M. Majoras, The "New" Wave in Smoking and Health Litigation-Is
Anything Really So New?, 54 Tenn L Rev 551 (1987); Alan Schwartz, Views of
Addiction and the Duty to Warn, 75 Va L Rev 509 (1989) ("Schwartz, Views of
Addiction"). For a broader economic assessment of the cigarette market, see
Robert Tollison and Richard E. Wagner, Smoking and the State: Social Costs,
Rent Seeking, and Public Policy (D.C. Heath, 1988).
2 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment i at 352 (cited in note 1).
3 112 S Ct 2608 (1992).
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woman developed lung cancer, she and her husband brought suit
under state law against the manufacturers of the cigarettes that she
had smoked for several decades. This law suit, which was pursued by
the woman's survivors after she died, sought to hold the manufacturers
liable in damages for the effects of the cancer that was allegedly caused
by the cigarettes. The plaintiffs advanced several legal theories, all of
which were based on state law, and most of which were variations on
the claim that the defendants had concealed or misrepresented infor-
mation about the dangers of cigarette smoking. The manufacturers
contended, as one of their defenses, that their conduct after 1965 was
insulated from liability by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Adver-
tising Act, enacted in 1965, and its successor, the Public Health Ciga-
rette Smoking Act of 1969. The defendants argued that these federal
statutes, which required specific warning labels on cigarette packages
and advertisements, defined the extent of their legal duties to provide
information about the risks of smoking and preempted any state-law
claims that presupposed a duty to take steps other than those required
by the federal statutes. The Supreme Court accepted the case in order
to consider the preemptive effect of the federal statutes on the follow-
ing state-law claims: that the manufacturers breached express warran-
ties contained in their cigarette advertising; that they tortiously failed
to warn consumers about the hazards of smoking; that they fraudu-
lently misrepresented the hazards of smoking to consumers; and that
they conspired to deprive consumers of relevant scientific information
about the effects of smoking.
The Supreme Court was unable to produce a majority opinion
resolving all the issues that were raised, and the future of the law of
preemption was left wrapped in some obscurity. This outcome, which
may be of considerable concern to the legal profession, is not the focus
of my interest here. Instead, I will examine the three opinions offered
by the Justices with an eye to evaluating their soundness as a matter of
economics. The results of this examination are quite startling. The
opinion for three Justices written by Justice Blackmun and the opinion
for two Justices written by Justice Scalia both rely explicitly on eco-
nomic reasoning. The two opinions reach diametrically opposed con-
clusions, neither of which seems to be economically sound on the
economically most important issue in the case. Justice Stevens' opinion
for four Justices almost completely eschews economic reasoning, yet
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comes closest to an economically sound result. This is particularly
striking inasmuch as the Stevens opinion is sharply criticized both by
Scalia and by Blackmun for its legally confusing results, a charge that
Stevens does not seriously attempt to rebut.
This curious outcome leads me to suspect that the Stevens plural-
ity may have been guided by economic principles to a greater extent
than it was willing to acknowledge, and that it chose to sacrifice some
legal clarity in the interest of those principles. Because the Stevens
group was both the largest faction among the Justices and the "inter-
mediate" position legally, Stevens' approach may be the one most like-
ly to be followed in the future. If so, that is probably good news from the
standpoint of economic efficiency, however frustrating it may be to
those lawyers who must try to make sense out of the law of preemption.
If my suspicions are correct, the Cipollone case should also serve to
warn us against assuming that the efficiency of judicial decisions can
reliably be inferred from the nature of the economic reasoning that
appears (or fails to appear) on the surface of a judicial opinion.
II. THE ECONOMICS OF WARNINGS AND INFORMED CHOICE
A. The Analytics of Risky Consumer Decisions
An instructive starting point for assessing the role of the two ciga-
rette warnings statutes in relationship to the producer's obligations is
to address generally the nature of consumer decisions in situations in
which there are risks and hazard warnings. The appropriate economic
question is whether the smoker derives a higher expected utility from
smoking behavior based on an assessment of the risks before the injury
has occurred. Certainly, if the smoker is injured ex post there will typi-
cally he regret over the smoking decision. However, the appropriate
reference point in economic contexts involving lotteries such as this is
to ascertain whether accurate prior risk information, as opposed to
knowledge that you yourself will suffer an injury, would affect the deci-
sion to purchase the risky product.4
4 The thousands of investors who purchased corporate stock this week and
who will observe price declines will regret their decisions ex post, but this
does not mean that at the time these investments were made that they were
necessarily incorrect. Similarly, the investments that are profitable were not
necessarily good investments, but may simply be investments that benefitted
from fortuitous circumstances.
HeinOnline  -- 3 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 242 1993
W Ki Vscusi
For concreteness, assume that the consumer has an income level
Y, which will yield a welfare level, which I will call utility W ), if the
consumer does not purchase cigarettes. The consumer can purchase
cigarettes at a price P, and doing so will yield a utility U(Y-P) if he
remains healthy and V(Y-P) if he does not. For simplicity, we will com-
press the potential health ramifications of cigarettes into a single
health state (ill health) and into a single period. The true risks of ill
health posed by cigarettes are 7r, and the probability that the smoker
will remain healthy is (1--4). As a result, the expected utility conferred
by smoking is (1-rr)U(Y-P) + 7rV(Y-P). It will never be desirable to
smoke unless the utility conferred by smoking when healthy exceeds
the utility of not smoking at all.
It is useful to establish a reference point for the risk-utility test.5 A
product passes an efficiency test if the expected utility based on the
true risks tr exceed the utility conferred by not purchasing cigarettes at
all. This condition is given by
(1-t) U(Y-P) + 7r V(Y-P) > W(M. (1)
The risk levels and the payoffs here pertain only to the smoker and
not to others in society who are affected by smoking. One could envi-
sion broader kinds of efficiency tests involving second-hand smoke,
fire-related injuries to others, and genetic damage from smoking. How-
ever, these kinds of broader tests involve complex judgments as to the
overall social benefits and costs of smoking. For example, smokers cost
society money in terms of higher health insurance benefits, but save
society money in terms of lower pension costs and social security
costs. 6 Cigarette production also has complex effects on international
trade and employment. These kinds of broader societal issues are best
addressed through government regulation and national smoking poli-
s Implicit in any analysis is that the risk-utility test should serve as the con-
text for assessing the desirability of warnings. For elaboration of my views
on the role of this test, see W. Kip Viscusi, Reforming Products Liability
(Harvard, 1991) ("Viscusi, Reforming Products Liability"); ALl Reporter's
Study (cited in note 1).
6 See Willard G. Manning, et al, The Costs of PoorHealth Habits (Harvard,
1991).
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cies more generally than through tort litigation.7 As a result, from the
standpoint of this paper I will focus only on the risks to the consumer
and whether the purchaser of the product is making a sound decision.
This is also the focus of the Cipollone case.
B. Accuracy of Risk Perceptions
The actual decision made by the smoker is not based on the true
probabilities rr, but instead is governed by the risks as perceived by the
potential smoker. Thus, what is pertinent is not the value of tr but
rather the perceived risk q where
q = Q(warnings, other company risk communication, other
company actions, public information, private knowledge). (2)
As equation 2 indicates, individuals' subjective risk perceptions reflect
a variety of influences, many of which may be correlated with the actual
risk of the product 'i. The sources of information that can contribute to
subjective probabilistic judgments include the hazard warnings; other
risk information such as that in advertising; other company actions
that might affect risk perceptions such as non-risk information in
advertising; public information provided about cigarettes; and private
knowledge that the smoker might obtain either from his own experi-
ences or those of others. The general task of warnings is typically to
provide new information in a convincing manner. Firms should not be
responsible for performing a general educational function. For exam-
ple, manufacturers of cars need not inform consumers how to drive or
indicate that driving is dangerous. Rather, the only obligation of the
manufacturer is to convey information with respect to risks that con-
sumers are unlikely to be aware of based on personal experience or
general public knowledge. Idiosyncratic information about a product
would be one type of risk information that would be useful.
This formulation abstracts from the dynamics associated with
smoking behavior. Individuals' risk perceptions may change over time.
The attractiveness of smoking to them may also diminish, leading to a
desire to quit. However, as many observers have noted, quitting ciga-
7 For further advocacy of this view, see Viscusi, ReformingProductsLiability
(cited in note 5), in which I detail quite explicitly different levels of risk-utility
tests that can be taken with respect to the product's effect on the consumer
and on society at large.
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rettes is often costly, an effect that some have labeled an issue of "ad-
diction."8
In assessing the welfare loss associated with costs of altering
smoking behavior, the accuracy of probabilistic judgments plays a cen-
tral role. If at the time individuals began smoking they are aware of the
risk, the consequences of smoking for their well-being, and their future
attitude toward smoking, then even if they would like to quit smoking
subsequently, the initial smoking decision may have been efficient. For
example, suppose Hillary begins smoking at age 21 understanding the
risks and anticipating that when she reaches 30 she would like to quit
smoking, but will find it difficult to do so. The efficiency properties of
this economic outcome are much more attractive if Hillary anticipated
this course of events at the time she began smoking than if she did not
anticipate the risks or her subsequent desire to give up smoking.
A primary matter of concern will be whether the level of risk per-
ceptions reflected in an individual's subjective risk assessment q is suf-
ficient, when compared to the true risk ir. Firms that supply consumer
products will not necessarily have met their appropriate obligations by
providing information about the general category of risks. Indicating
that lung cancer or heart disease is a potential consequence of smoking
does not convey the significance of the risk. The company's responsi-
bility goes beyond providing information that will lead consumers to
have an assessed probability q that is nonzero. This distinction is im-
portant because the warnings themselves provide no explicit probabil-
istic information concerning the level of the risk. This is true not only of
cigarettes but virtually all other mass-marketed products as well.9
8 For diverging viewpoints on the addiction issue, see Cass R. Sunstein,
After the Rights Revolution (Harvard, 1990); Schwartz, Views of Addiction
(cited in note 1); and Thomas C. Schelling, Choice and Consequence
(Harvard, 1984).
9 One exception is that in some rare cases of pharmaceutical products, the
hazard warning includes explicit information concerning the frequency of
adverse reactions and other adverse repercussions of prescription drugs.
However, in this case the audience for the warning is the learned intermedi-
ary, the physician, rather than the patient. In the absence of providing back-
ground training on the processing of probabilistic information, it may be
overly optimistic to assume that detailed quantitative risk information can
be conveyed in a manner that will be processed reliably.
HeinOnline  -- 3 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 245 1993
CIGARETTE WARNINGS
Though the framework has been constructed in terms of a single
health outcome, ill health, it could be generalized to capture a multi-
tude of health outcomes, each of which has a separate risk perception
and an associated true probability. Clearly it may not be the case that
individuals correctly perceive all of the adverse consequences of smok-
ing, including lung cancer, throat cancer, stroke, heart disease, emphy-
sema, and a wide range of other effects. What is sufficient is that on
balance the assessment of the risks is sufficient to discourage smoking
to the same extent as would accurate risk perceptions. Let there be n-1
categories of risks, each of which has an associated probability ri and
a utility function for ill health of Vi(Y-P). There could be a separate
utility function for each health outcome. The question of whether
smoking behavior is efficient in a tax-free world consequently reduces
to whether:
n n
(I- Z rr~ ) U(Y-P) + Z wivT(Y-P) < WMO. (3)i=2 i=2
For ease of exposition, the subsequent discussion will be in terms of the
stylized model that focuses on the two-outcome situation of good
health and ill health.
C. Market-Based Tests
Even if individuals make a mistake and err in their smoking deci-
sion, the welfare losses may be small. Consumers may suffer very little
welfare loss if they do not underestimate the probability of harm sub-
stantially. For individuals who underestimate the risks of smoking by a
considerable amount, the potential for welfare loss is much greater.
Since cigarettes are marketed to millions of consumers, some of whom
are aware of the risks and some of whom are not, how can one judge
whether the product meets the risk-utility test? Let us begin with a situ-
ation in which there are no impediments to consumer decisions. Taxes
are zero, and subjective risk assessments equal the true probabilities.
Let S be the amount the individual needs to be made indifferent
between smoking and not smoking, or
(1--W) U(Y+ S-P) + wV(Y+ S-P) = W(M. (4)
For individuals for whom smoking is a rational act, the value of S will
be zero or negative. If, however, it is not efficient for the individual to
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smoke, the value of S will be positive, which indicates that the individ-
ual would have to be compensated to bear the true risks of smoking.
Thus, S measures the absolute amount of the welfare loss or gain asso-
ciated with smoking decisions.
Several observations are worth making. First, the size of the loss
matters. If individuals are making small errors with a low value of S,
then societal concern with this outcome will be less than if the magni-
tude of these loss values is large.
Second, and most important, companies cannot sell their prod-
ucts to representative, identifiable consumers. More specifically, com-
panies cannot distinguish those consumers who purchase their
products because they underperceive the risks and those who do so
because they place a high value on the smoking experience. The funda-
mental liability issue is whether on balance removing the product from
the market, redesigning it, or mandating particular warnings will raise
overall consumer welfare. In particular, when the S values given by
equation 4 are aggregated across all consumers, not simply the seg-
ment who are making an error in purchasing the product, will banning
the product, altering the product, or mandating warnings for it raise
consumer welfare? In a two-consumer situation in which one consum-
er rationally smokes (with a negative value of S) and another consumer
is making an error by smoking (with a positive value of S), cigarettes
are nevertheless a desirable economic product if the value of S that is
negative for the efficient smoker has a larger absolute magnitude than
the positive value of S for the misinformed smoker.
In general it will not be feasible to convey fully accurate risk infor-
mation to all parties and to make q equal 7tr for all consumers. Hazard
warnings do not convey some true probability 7r of the product risk.
Instead, the typical warnings function to provide partial risk informa-
tion, to alert consumers to the presence of a hazard, and generally to
raise the level of risk perceptions associated with the product. Even
with an effective warning some consumers may underestimate the risk,
some may have accurate risk perceptions, and some may overestimate
the risk. To judge whether more stringent warnings are worthwhile, one
must ascertain whether the efficiency gains from increasing the value
of the risk perception q, as measured by the change in the values of S
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for all consumers, is sufficient to warrant the expenditure to provide
the information.
An important application of this principle is to the provision of
warnings to particular segments of the product user group. High risk
users who are particularly sensitive to certain chemicals and groups
who have difficulty in processing warnings information, such as
non-English speaking product users, may require separate warnings
programs or additional warnings efforts targeted to meet their special
needs. Are such efforts worthwhile?
The appropriate test should be market-based. There will be some
net gain in welfare to the group receiving the targeted warnings, but
there may be a loss to other groups. Provision of additional risk infor-
mation for sensitive population subgroups may, for example, generate
problems of label clutter and information overload for the groups who
will not profit from these additional warnings. The appropriate eco-
nomic test is whether the net welfare gain measured by aggregating the
incremental effect of the warnings change or the change in S values in
equation 4 exceeds the additional costs of information provision.
Risk-utility tests for adequacy of warnings consequently must be
undertaken using a market-based orientation.
D. Cigarette Excise Taxes
There is an additional complication as well because consumer
demand for cigarettes is influenced not only by individuals' risk per-
ceptions but also by taxes specifically linked to the product.10 Ciga-
rette taxes, which will be designated by T, constitute 30.8 percent of the
retail price of cigarettes, and the Clinton administration is considering
seeking a quantum leap in their level." Taxes consequently play a con-
10 Since consumers will have a perceived probability q associated with each
of these adverse outcomes, the condition for the product to be attractive to
the consumer if there are cigarette excise taxes is given by
n n
(1 - qj)U(Y-P-7) + , qi'V(Y-P-T) > W(Y).
i=2 i=2
11 These retail tax percentages are for 1985 in order to establish comparabil-
ity with the assessed economic implications of the role of taxes to be dis-
cussed below. For discussion of this tax information, see W. Kip Viscusi,
Smoking: Making the Risky Decision 101-09 (Oxford, 1992) ("Viscusi, Smok-
ing"), especially the discussion at 109.
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siderable role in influencing the attractiveness of this product. Con-
sumers will decide to smoke if their expected utility from smoking net
of taxes, cigarette prices, and health losses is greater than their utility
when not smoking, or
(1-q)U(Y-P-T) + qV(Y-P-T) > WM1. (5)
This requirement differs from the efficiency test given in equation
1 above. First, the pertinent probabilities from the standpoint of the
consumer are the probabilities perceived to be the risks associated
with cigarettes, and these may not coincide with the true probabilities
involved. It is this potential difference in the probabilities that esta-
blishes both the potential role for hazard warnings as well as the ratio-
nale for tort liability in product safety contexts. Otherwise, market
outcomes would be efficient.
The second departure from equation 1 is that the utility functions
in each smoking state include a tax component. The role of these tax-
es-often called "sin taxes"-is in many respects similar to that of
effluent charges in pollution contexts. By imposing taxes on a polluter,
the government can achieve the same kinds of environmental quality
improvement as can be achieved through rigid specification stan-
dards. In the cigarette context, taxes that are proportional to the num-
ber of cigarettes smoked can be viewed as a mechanism for providing
incentives to decrease smoking that will discourage smoking just as
would higher risk perceptions. There have also been suggestions to
refine the cigarette tax to include recognition of the tar and nicotine
content of cigarettes.12
The extent to which excise taxes should be recognized in this
analysis depends both on one's reference point and the nature of the
market failure. Suppose that individual smoking decisions are efficient
from the standpoint of the smoker, but that second-hand smoke
generates diseases not incorporated in the smoker's decision. The
result is that smokers will consume too many cigarettes, and too many
people will smoke. A cigarette excise tax can reduce smoking levels to a
socially optimal amount.13
12 See Jeffrey E. Harris, Taxing Tar and Nicotine, 70 Am Econ Rev 300
(1980).
13 Ideally, one would, however, like to vary the tax depending on the loca-
tion of the smoking activity, the number of exposed individuals, and the
smoker's concern with their own welfare.
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If, however, the market failure stems from inadequate risk percep-
tions, some people who should not smoke given the risks will do so. A
cigarette excise tax can prevent these people from smoking so that only
those who would have met equation 1 will smoke. However, the people
who choose to smoke in the presence of the tax may experience a drop
in their expected welfare based on the true probabilities since they
must pay the tax.14 If the liability reference point is that the smoker's
expected welfare must be raised by the product, net of the taxes paid
and given the true probabilities, the ability of excise taxes to promote
sound outcomes is more limited.
Moreover, one can never justify inclusion of general sales taxes in
such an approach. The main difference is that a sales tax affects the
attractiveness of purchasing the risky product and the attractiveness of
alternative consumer expenditures reflected in W(Y). The influence of
a broadly-based sales tax typically will not distort the comparison
between expenditures on cigarettes and expenditures on other goods.' 5
The excise taxes on cigarettes discourage smoking just as would a
substantial increase in risk perception.16 Using as a metric the lung
cancer risk perception equivalent of excise taxes, one finds the follow-
ing. For consumer groups who are relatively insensitive to the price,
excise taxes discourage smoking by roughly the same extent as would a
perceived risk of lung cancer from smoking of .17. For the more
price-sensitive groups, such as teenagers, excise taxes function in the
same manner as would endowing them with a lung cancer risk percep-
tion of .51. Thus, even if individuals on their own set the perceived risks
of smoking equal to 0, excise taxes would discourage smoking by
roughly the same extent as would believing the chance of getting lung
cancer from smoking range from 1 in 5 to 1 in 2, depending on the par-
ticular consumer group. Excise taxes consequently have a powerful
14 Thus, one may have
(1-,rr)U(Y-P-T) + 7rV(Y-P-7) < W(Y)
and
(1-q)U(Y-P-T) + qV(Y-P-7) > W(9.
's There may be some minor differences to the extent that the price elastic-
ity of cigarettes differs from the price elasticity of other goods, but these are
likely to be inconsequential in most situations. Moreover, if there are differ-
ences of this type, it is unclear whether they should be taken into account.
16 See Viscusi, Smoking 101-09 (cited in note 11).
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effect on the smoking decision and must necessarily condition any
judgments with respect to the social efficiency of additional mecha-
nisms for discouraging smoking.
Excise taxes were high not only in the mid-1980s-the time period
of the calculations above-but also during the 1960s, which is the peri-
od in which the two labeling acts considered in the Cipollone decision
were promulgated. In 1965 and 1969, cigarette taxes constituted 51.4
and 47.7 percent of the retail price of cigarettes respectively. 17
III. HAZARD WARNINGS AND RISK BELIEFS
A. Warnings Objectives
If taxes are excluded from the analysis, the overall objective of haz-
ard warnings and other interventions is to raise the value of q to equal
7r. Companies will, of course, not be penalized by the courts if they pro-
vide excessively alarmist warnings leading to q > IT, so that there is an
asymmetry in how the divergences from accurate perceptions are
addressed. The result is that the courts create incentives for over-
warning.
Such proliferation of unnecessary warnings is not a harmless out-
come. Excessive warnings clutter the warnings landscape and make it
more difficult for consumers to identify which products are hazardous
and which are not. Given individuals' cognitive limitations, such prob-
lems of information overload are not a minor concern, but are central
to the overall efficacy of hazard warnings in our society.
As equation 2 indicates, there are a variety of different mecha-
nisms that can be used to affect risk perceptions. Company-provided
warnings are but one information source. The government can provide
information to consumers directly, as it has been required to do by
Congress since 1964 by issuing annual reports of the Surgeon General.
These public information efforts may affect consumer perceptions
directly or may generate other media attention. The risks of smoking
have been a prominent concern in the media, as is reflected in a count
of articles dealing with smoking in Reader's Digest-the most widely
read magazine over the past 40 years. This count, illustrated in Figure 1,
17 See TaxBurden on Tobacco, Historical Compilation, Volume 26, 1991 at 84,
88 (Tobacco Institute, 1992).
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indicates a steady rise in smoking articles over the past four decades. 18
However, even before the advent of warnings and the more recent pub-
lic attention given to smoking, the risks of smoking were a significant
media concern likely to be reflected in consumer judgments.
Figure 1
Reader's Digest Article Count
1950 to 1959
<<./ :.....< .. ..> :,.<,,< ....... ,..<<.,.,., ...1960 to 1969 .""
1970 to 1979
1980 to 1989 ,. ,........ ..... .. .. *.*.
0 0 15 20 25
Source: Visousi, Smoking at 36 (cited in note 11)
B. Trends in Risk Beliefs
These concerns are also reflected in the public opinion polls over
the past half century. Table 1 provides the Gallup Poll opinion survey
results for individual awareness of the cancer risks of smoking, where I
will focus primarily on lung cancer, since it is a risk for which we have
the most continuous long-term information using opinion poll data.' 9
These questions are not ideal since they focus on awareness of smoking
risks as opposed to levels of risk perceptions. Nevertheless, the trends
in these risk perceptions are of interest. During the period before the
advent of hazard warnings and mandated warnings, just under half of
the population was aware of lung cancer risks from smoking. Subse-
quent to the on-package warnings and the increased public dissemina-
tion of information pertaining to smoking in the 1960s, the awareness
1 For documentation, see Viscusi, Smoking at 35, 36 (cited in note 11).
19 The time trends in other risk perceptions are not necessarily identical.
For discussions of these differences, see Viscusi, Smoking chapter 3 (cited in
note 11).
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Table 1
Gallup Poll Opinion Surveys, 1949-1981:
Questions on Cigarette Smoking and Cancer
(% responding positively)
All Cigarette Non-cig. Former cig.
Question Year respondents smokers smokers smokers
Cigarette smoking 1954 41 30 48 54
one of causes of
lung cancer?
One of causes 7/1957 50 38 59 --
of cancer of 12/1957 47 35 ....
lung? 1958 44 33 ....
1958a  45 33 ....
1969 70 ......
Is/is not one 19 7 1b 71 ......
cause of lung 1972 70 ......
cancer? 1977 81 72 87 --
1981 83 69 91 --
Smoking as cause 1977 79 73 82 --
of throat cancer? 1981 81 69 87 --
aSpecial SurveybSurvey taken in nine different nations, but this figure is for U.S. responses only.
of these risks increased to about 70 percent of the population, and has
since risen to 80 percent. Risk perceptions certainly were not zero
before the advent of the hazard warnings and public information
campaigns in the 1960s, but these efforts did affect the awareness of
smoking risks. 20
In this situation as in other contexts involving risk communica-
tion, increasing risk perceptions will not necessarily lead to more accu-
rate risk beliefs. Choices under uncertainty are replete with various
perceptional biases. It is well-known that individuals tend to overesti-
mate the risks associated with low probability events. How this phe-
nomenon affects the risk perceptions with respect to smoking is
unclear since the lifetime smoking risks are quite substantial, whereas
the smoking risks per cigarette are low. Research has also indicated
that individuals tend to overreact to risks that are called to their atten-
20 Analysis of the effect of cigarette health information appears in Lynne
Schneider, Benjamin Klein, and Kevin Murphy, Governmental Regulation of
Cigarette Health Information, 24 J L & Econ 575 (1981); Staff Report on Con-
sumer Responses to Cigarette Health Information (FTC, 1979); and, more
comprehensively, Viscusi, Smoking chapters 2-3 (cited in note 11).
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tion.21 The advent of hazard warnings makes the risks of smoking iden-
tifiable, and the annual reports by the Surgeon General serve to further
highlight these risks. Given the tendency to overestimate risks that are
given frequent media coverage, such as earthquakes, tornadoes, and
floods, one might expect this substantial public information effort to
also lead to potential risk overestimation for smoking.22 There is, how-
ever, a tendency to underestimate disease risks such as stroke and
heart disease, which are not dramatic or highly publicized. This factor
would lead individuals to underestimate some of the risks of smoking.
Overall, because of the conflicting directions of the various patterns of
perceptional bias, it is not possible a priori to predict the direction of
the bias in smoking risk perceptions, if any. To resolve the issue regard-
ing the direction of the bias, I have examined extensive survey evidence.
My survey results for the post-warning era indicate that the poten-
tial for risk overestimation is more than conjecture.23 Table 2 summa-
rizes the results for two surveys, the first of which was a national survey
undertaken in 1985 and the second was a regional survey that I under-
took in 1991. Evidence from a large national sample of individuals indi-
cates that overall individuals believe the assessed risk of lung cancer
from smoking is .43, and the risk assessed by current smokers is .37.
Table 2
Summary of Smoking Risk Perceptions
Mean (Standard error of mean)
Risk Category Full Sample Smokers
Lung cancer risk perception .43 .37
(1985) (.01) (.01)
Lung cancer fatality risk .38 .31
perception (1991) (.02) (.04)
Total mortality risk to .54 .47
smokers (1991) (.07) (.05)
21 See W. Kip Viscusi and Wesley A. Magat, LearningAbout Risk: Consumer
and Worker Responses to Hazard Information (Harvard, 1987).
22 The prominence of smoking risks is discussed in Baruch Fischhoff et al,
Acceptable Risk (Cambridge, 1981). Barbara Combs and Paul Slovik, Newspa-
per Coverage of Causes of Death, 56 Journalism Q 837 (1979), assess the role
of publicity in affecting risk perceptions.
23 For documentation, see Viscusi, Smoking at 49, 50 (cited in note 11).
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Whether these risk perceptions are too high or too low depends on
the overall level of the risks actually posed by smoking. Estimates
based on the scientific evidence available at the time of the two surveys
discussed above appears in Table 3. Since the lung cancer mortality
risk to smokers was estimated by scientists to be .05- .10 using data up
to the survey year 1985, these results suggest that individuals dramati-
cally overestimate this component of the hazards of smoking.
There is also a tendency to overestimate other components of the
risks of smoking, although to a lesser extent. Based on a 1991 sample, I
found that the overall perceived lung cancer fatality risk was .38, and
the total perceived smoking mortality risk from all causes was .54.
These amounts contrasted with scientists' 1991 estimates of the risks of
lung cancer mortality of .06 -. 31 and total smoking mortality of .18 -
.36. Both the lung cancer fatality risks and the smoking mortality risks
are overestimated, although the total mortality risk is overestimated to
a lesser extent. Even smokers tend to overestimate the risk, as they
perceive the lung cancer fatality risk to be .31 and the total smoking
mortality risk as .47.
Individuals also overassess the extent of life that is lost. Scientific
evidence based on 1991 data suggest that the estimated life expectancy
loss from smoking is 3.6 to 7.2 years.24 On average, people estimate a
life expectancy loss of 11.5 years, and current smokers estimate that
their life expectancy loss from smoking is 9.0 years.
Table 3
Actual smoking risk ranges in 1985 and 1991
Lung cancer mortality Total mortality Total mortality
Survey Year risk to smoker risk to smoker risk to society
1985 .05-.10 .16-.32 .21-.42
1991 .06-.13 .18-.36 .23-.46
C. Effect of Risk Perceptions on Behavior
Even if smokers are aware of the risks associated with smoking,
these risk perceptions may not affect smoking decisions. Individuals
might, for example, not fully perceive the consequences of the adverse
health effects of smoking for their welfare or may undervalue or over-
24 See Viscusi, Smoking at 79-81 (cited in note 11).
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value these consequences. To resolve these issues, I have explored the
influence of risk perceptions on smoking decisions and have found
strong statistical relationships.
An index of the responsiveness of smoking to risk perceptions is
needed to explore how smoking rates would change if we altered risk
perceptions. Scientific evidence at the time of the 1985 national survey
indicates that the true lung cancer risk range is from .05- .10 for a typi-
cal smoker. If the public's perception of the lung cancer risk associated
with smoking was lowered from its current average value of .43 to .10,
then the average rate of smoking in the United States would rise by
over 6 percent.25 Similarly, if the risk perceptions were lowered to a
level of percent.
Another index of the extent to which the response to risk percep-
tions by smokers is of the same magnitude as would prevail with per-
fect markets is obtained by examining the implicit values that smokers
attach to various health outcomes. Based on the response of smokers
to the dissemination of cigarette health information using a sample of
smokers from 1980, one study found that these individuals had an
implicit value of life of from $300,000 - $600,000.26 These value-of-life
estimates are roughly comparable to or a bit lower than those found for
workers on high risk jobs during a similar time period.27 This pattern is
consistent with the lower implicit values placed on health status by
smokers in job risk contexts. For example, I report that the implicit
value that smokers attach to nonfatal job injuries involving at least one
lost workday is $26,100, as compared with the implicit value of $47,900
that the average individual places on such outcomes. 28 Not surpris-
ingly, nonsmoking seat belt users are at the high end of the spectrum,
as they attach a value of $83,200 to job injuries. Thus, there is consis-
tency in terms of attitudes toward risk across different activities.
15 See Viscusi, Smoking at 100 (cited in note 11).
26 Pauline M. Ippolito and Richard A. Ippolito, Measuring the Value of Life
Saving from ConsumerReactions to New Information, 25 J Pub Econ 53 (1984).
27 See W. Kip Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs: Public and Private Responsibilities for
Risk chapter 4 (Oxford, 1992).
2s W. Kip Viscusi, Smoking at 112 (cited in note 11).
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D. Judging the Adequacy of Risk Communication
The overall implication of these smoking risk perception patterns
is that one should be careful in interpreting and judging the efficacy of
any risk communication effort. The task is not simply to raise risk
beliefs but to make them more accurate. Risk information that, for the
most part, simply highlights a category of risk will tend to boost risk
perceptions and may lead to overestimates of the risk.
The risk information that warnings provide is not in terms of
probabilities, such as indicating that there is a 1 in 4 chance of death.
Rather, warnings communicate more general information regarding
the presence and severity of the risks. It will always be possible to make
the message more strident, as has been proposed by some California
legislators who have suggested labels such as: "WARNING: The
tobacco industry is not your friend. ' 29 The American Medical Associ-
ation also has ventured forth into the unfamiliar territory of the science
of risk communication, and has urged the warning: "Smoking is
ADDICTIVE and may result in DEATH. '30 Other manipulations of
the design of the current warning, such as putting it in day-glo lettering,
might also increase its prominence. However, a more strident hazard
warnings policy is not necessarily better. The task is to inform choice,
not to deter choice. The current situation may already be one of over-
deterrence. Individuals greatly overestimate the risks of lung cancer
associated with smoking, overestimate the total mortality risks, and
overestimate the life expectancy loss.
The key question is what level of warnings is needed to achieve the
efficient consumer decisions that satisfy the tests outlined in Section
II? To properly address the implications of the 1965 and 1969 congres-
sional enactments, one should return to the risk communication for-
mulation specified in equation 2. Companies have two primary
mechanisms for communicating the risk, hazard warnings and other
risk communication efforts. It makes little sense to say that one compo-
nent of the company decisions, hazard warnings, suffices as an ade-
quate risk communication device without in effect making some
29 Seth Mydans, California Opens All-Out War on Tobacco and Its Marketing,
New York Times Al (April 11, 1990).
30 ScientistsAgree Smoking Harmful: Industry Funding Is Questioned, Durham
Morning Herald A12 (June 26, 1991).
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judgment respecting the adequacy of the entire risk communication
system. It is possible that it is never efficient for the company to utilize
any mechanism other than hazard warnings to convey risk. Of all the
alternatives available to it, hazard warnings may be the least cost
means for conveying information. Indeed, the substantial focus of
court cases, federal legislation, and government regulations on the use
of on-product warnings reflects the prominence of the warning mecha-
nism. 31 If the mandated hazard warning will not lead to efficient deci-
sions, then in effect Congress has adopted an inefficient policy unless
this mode of communication has been optimally exploited. The effi-
cient outcome may require that the company augment the hazard
warning in some way. However, the most efficient mechanism for
communicating the risk has already been constrained by government.
The specific design, format, and wording of the warning must conform
with government-mandated standards. The company must conse-
quently resort to a less efficient mechanism for conveying the risk to
consumers.
Suppose the policy objective is to get risk perceptions up to some
level q*. The firm may have two different mechanisms to affect risk
perceptions, advertising and on-product warnings. If the firm were
unconstrained and given the task of providing information that would
achieve a risk perception of q*, then what would the stringency of the
warnings component be? If the firm would opt for a stronger warning
than the government-mandated warning, then an efficient outcome will
not result if the courts require the firm to meet higher levels of advertis-
ing obligations than would have been the case if the firm had simply
been given the task of generating the q* risk perception in the least cost
manner possible.
Government constraints on a component of hazard communica-
tion listed in equation 2 will not always lead to an inefficiency. In the
extreme case, the government requirements may force firms to fully
exploit the potential of one particular mechanism for risk communica-
tion so that it would never be desirable to do more than is required with
this mode. However, hazard warnings play a central role within the
31 There are exceptions, such as required training for workers who use
potent pesticides. Information with respect to the risks of driving similarly
requires that one do more than read an on-product warning. As a result,
states have a variety of driving tests to promote driving safety.
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context of risk communication. Indeed, such legal cases are typically
designated warnings cases, not risk communication efforts, in recogni-
tion of their prominence. To take the extreme case, if hazard warnings
were the only risk communication mechanism, it would certainly not be
sensible to impose additional warnings requirements beyond the man-
dated warning because the specification of the warning language and
format in the government-mandated warning not only limits the com-
pany's options with respect to additional warnings but also compli-
cates efforts to alter the warning. Expanding the warning may either
undercut the mandated warning or lead to label clutter that impedes
processing of the key warning information by the intended recipient
group.
A complication of a quite different nature arises if firms relax
some risk communication efforts, such as product risk information in
advertising, after mandatory warnings have been imposed. The alco-
holic beverage industry, for example, has indicated that voluntary
advertising about the risks of drunk driving will decrease if the govern-
ment mandates that various hazard warnings be included in alcoholic
beverage advertising. Such actions do not directly undercut the effect
of the mandated warning, but they may lead to a less effective system of
risk communication.
In situations in which there is government regulation of warnings
and more than one mode of risk communication should be utilized to
ensure effective risk communication, these other mechanisms should
be regulated. Cigarette warnings, for example, not only appear on the
product but are included in print advertising as well. The government
similarly couples labeling efforts for pesticides with a requirement that
users of dangerous chemicals pass a training program and become cer-
tified pesticide applicators. Drug warnings are sufficient for less dan-
gerous drugs, but more dangerous drugs are designated prescription
drugs, and their use must be authorized by a physician. Once the gov-
ernment has intervened in such contexts and constrained certain
aspects of hazard communication systems, ideally the set of regula-
tions should ensure that the risk information provided about the prod-
uct is adequate.
To avoid situations where the government regulation will lead to
inefficient hazard communication mechanisms, the provision of the
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hazard warning mandated by the regulation should be regarded as suf-
ficient. It is this perspective that will govern my discussion below
regarding the legal implications of the 1965 and 1969 statutes at issue in
Cipollone. To the extent that these laws have a preemptive effect, they
should preempt all hazard communication obligations of the firm.
This formulation also highlights the fact that the extent of the pre-
emptive effect should be restricted to the firm's hazard communica-
tion obligations. The fact that the government has mandated warnings
in no way impedes the company's ability to design a safer product. Nor
does it reduce a company's responsibility to learn about the product
risks. Our knowledge at the time a warning is given may not be so pre-
cise that we should foreclose the possibility of learning more about the
risks. To the extent that companies would have an obligation to under-
take product risk research and respond to, for example, reports of
adverse reactions, this responsibility should be a continuing one. Par-
ticularly in the case of health hazards, as opposed to acute safety risks
for which the scientific issues can be resolved more immediately, there
is an ongoing process of information acquisition. Indeed, the fact that
Surgeon General's reports appear annually as opposed to once each
decade reflects the evolving knowledge of smoking.
IV Tim 1965 CIGARETM WARNINGS
A. History of Cigarette Warnings
The health aspects of smoking have long been the subject not only
of public debate but also of the advertising campaigns of the compan-
ies. Even in the 1920s, health claims with respect to smoking were a
prominent part of the advertising content.32 Indeed, the risks of smok-
ing have been discussed, perhaps as long as cigarettes have been in
existence. In the seventeenth century, Popes Innocent X and Urban
VIII excommunicated smokers. 33 Moreover, a century ago cigarettes
became an object of vigorous public debate after James B. Duke intro-
32 See W. Kip Viscusi, Smoking at 40-43 (cited in note 11). Ringold and
Calfee review the nature of cigarette advertising throughout the century.
D.J. Ringold and J.E. Calfee, The Informational Content of CigaretteAdvertis-
ing: 1926-1986, 8 J Pub Pol & Management 1 (1989).
33 See Cassandra Tate, In the 1800s, Antismoking Was a Burning Issue, 20
Smithsonian 107, 108 (1989) (' eate, Antismoking").
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duced mechanization into the cigarette industry, thus making it a
mass-marketed consumer product:
Beginning with Washington in 1893, no fewer than 14 states out-
lawed the sale, manufacture, possession, advertising and/or use of
cigarettes, aka coffin nails, little white slavers, dope sticks, paper
pills, brain capsules, coffin pills, and devil's kindling wood. At least
21 other states and territories considered cigarette prohibition.
Congress was asked to protect the public health by requiring
that cigarette packages be stamped with a skull and crossbones, and
labelled "POISON." Many employers refused to hire cigarette
smokers. Nonsmokers said their health was being jeopardized by
"secondhand smoke. ' 34
Although these concerns were not new, public action in terms of risk
communication did not become reality until the landmark report by
the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in 1964 docu-
menting the risks of smoking.35
To put the different warnings eras in perspective, Table 4 below
summarizes the different hazard warning periods. The focus of this
section is on the first of these warnings introduced in 1965 under the
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act. In addition to impos-
ing this warnings requirement, the 1965 statute also included the fol-
lowing preemption provisions:
(a) No statement relating to smoking and health, other than
the statement required by section 4 of this Act, shall be required on
any cigarette package.
(b) No statement relating to smoking and health shall be
required in the advertising of any cigarettes the packages of which
are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this Act.
The Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965 con-
sequently had two key provisions. First, it mandated a quite specific
warning for cigarettes. Although this warning did not indicate the
numerical risk associated with smoking, evidence suggests that this
warning conveyed a cancer risk roughly comparable to that believed to
34 Jate, Antismoking at 107 (cited in note 33).
31 United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Smoking
andHealth: Report oftheAdvisory Committee to the Surgeon General of the Pub-
lic Health Service (Von Nostrand, 1964).
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be associated with smoking.36 The second key component of the Act is
that it included a preemption provision that limits the other warnings
requirements that can be imposed on the firm. The first fundamental
issue addressed by the Supreme Court in Cipollone is the extent to
which this preemption provision simply limited other government reg-
ulations or whether it also affects other obligations the firm might have
under common law rules.
Table 4






"Caution: Cigarette Smoking May Be
Hazardous to Your Health."
"Warning: The Surgeon General Has
Determined That Cigarette Smoking is
Dangerous To Your Health."
1. "SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING:
Smoking Causes Lung Cancer, Heart
Disease, Emphysema, and May Com-
plicate Pregnancy."
2. "SURGEON GENERAUS WARNING:
Quitting Smoking Now Greatly Reduces
Serious Risks to Your Health."
3. "SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING:
Smoking by Pregnant Women May
Result in Fetal Injury, Premature Birth,
and Low Birth Weight."
4. "SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING:
Cigarette Smoke Contains Carbon
Monoxide."
aihe wording of the warnings set out here has been specified by legislation. See 15 USC §
1333(a) (and historical note to that section) (1988).
36 In particular, in a comparison of different warning labels, I have found
that 69 percent of all respondents view the 1965 warning as conveying a risk
comparable to that of a label that implies a lifetime cancer risk of .12.
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B. The Majority's Analysis of the 1965 Act
There was a consensus among the members of the Supreme Court
that this provision certainly prohibited other state and federal rule-
making bodies from imposing specific cautionary statements on ciga-
rette labels and advertisements. The language of the Federal Labeling
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act is quite specific, and the legis-
lative history noted that substantial conflicts might arise if the states
issued conflicting or possibly different warnings requirements.
The economic rationale for preempting other kinds of regulations
is straightforward. For mass marketed consumer products, standard-
ized federal warnings labels provide a more efficient mode of com-
pliance. Indeed, it was partly the lower costs associated with federal
labeling as opposed to diverse state regulations that led firms to be
more willing to accept a political compromise based on federal inter-
vention. The role of preemption is to eliminate the inefficiencies that
can arise from conflicting regulatory obligations, and the Court prop-
erly concluded that these preemption provisions did in fact prohibit
restrictions "imposed under state law."
The broader issue over which there is more disagreement is the
extent to which the preemption provisions also limited plaintiffs' abil-
ity to make common law claims against a firm. For analytical clarity,
two general classes of claims will be considered, those that hinge on
showing that the company had failed in its obligation to communicate
the risks adequately, and those based on other rationales.
The latter class of claims can be addressed most readily. First, the
preemption provisions do not specifically preempt all obligations of
the firm, but only pertain to statements made with respect to smoking
and health. Moreover, from an economic standpoint, there is no ratio-
nale for preempting any claims other than those associated with risk
communication, assuming that the provision of warnings does not
affect the productivity of other actions the company might take to pro-
vide safer products. Other risk-related obligations of companies are in
no way affected by the hazard warnings requirement since these efforts
involve quite distinct economic decisions. There may be efficiency
losses if the firm abandons its legitimate responsibilities in these areas.
The effect of the preemption provisions on the firm's risk commu-
nication responsibilities merit more detailed exploration. If this
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preemption provision did not apply to hazard communication gener-
ally but only to the mandating of specific warnings, then the firm could
be required under common law, for example, to provide for a much
stronger risk communication system than is now in place. Mandated
warnings do not necessarily prevent the firm from doing this, but they
do constrain what is perhaps the most effective mechanism for the firm
to communicate the risk. As noted above, from an efficiency stand-
point the warnings requirement and the associated preemption provi-
sion is only sensible within the context of hazard communication if it
pertains to the entire hazard communication system rather than only a
part of it.
In construing the 1965 statute, the Blackmun faction joined that
portion of the Stevens opinion that rejected preemption of either class
of claims. Thus, the crucial distinction and the role of hazard commu-
nication systems is not recognized at all in the section of the Stevens
opinion joined by a majority of the Cipollone Court. Remarkably, this
line of reasoning is recognized, though clearly not fully understood, in
the discussion of the 1969 statute in the Blackmun opinion:
A manufacturer found liable on, for example, a failure-to-warn
claim may respond in a number of ways. It may decide to accept
damages awards as a cost of doing business and not alter its behavior
in any way.... Or, by contrast, it may choose to avoid future awards
by dispensing warnings through a variety of alternative mechanisms,
such as package inserts, public service advertisements, or general
educational programs. 37
While this view is correct in that it recognizes the multiplicity of
risk communication devices available to the firm, it is incomplete in
that it does not recognize the fact that one salient risk communication
mechanism, on-product warnings, has been constrained by federal
law. To mandate a specific risk communication tool available to the
firm and then to impose additional requirements on other risk commu-
nication mechanisms may lead to potential inefficiencies. Moreover, it
is true that companies can simply choose to incur damages awards and
not alter their behavior. However, a main function of these awards is to
provide incentives for companies to alter their behavior. It makes no
sense to impose a damages award if we do not hope to alter the actions
37 112 S Ct at 2628.
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of the companies that produce and market risky products. Rational
firms respond to the incentives they face on a variety of dimensions,
and these incentives will govern their behavior.38
C. Scalia's Dissent with Respect to the 1965 Act
The dissenting opinion by Justice Scalia (joined by only one other
Justice) displays a more complete understanding of the role of hazard
communication systems, and makes the correct economic inference:
Advertising and promotion are the normal means by which a man-
ufacturer communicates required product warnings to prospective
customers, and by far the most economical means. It is implausible
that Congress meant to save cigarette companies from being com-
pelled to convey such data to consumers through that means, only to
allow them to be compelled to do so through means more onerous
still.
39
In his opinion, Justice Scalia correctly identifies the potential effi-
ciency loss that can arise from the imposition of additional hazard
communication requirements on firms in contexts in which there are
mandated federal warnings. In its narrow interpretation of the 1965
preemption provisions, the Court's majority failed to display an appre-
ciation of the underlying economic choice that firms are making. The
preemption provisions only make economic sense if they pertain to the
entire hazard communication system, not specific modes within it.
Justice Scalia's view that the 1965 Act preempted all the fail-
ure-to-warn claims (although not those claims based on statements
volunteered by the cigarette companies) consequently is more consis-
tent with an efficient hazard communication policy.
The desirability of making the warnings requirement preemptive
is illustrated by comparing the situation in which providing the man-
dated warning fulfills the firm's obligations and that in which there
continues to be potential liability with respect to hazard warnings. If
38 If, for example, the losses associated with smoking are equivalent to
some monetary equivalent L, and these losses are paid by the firm because
of its failure to warn, then the expected losses associated with each consumer
will be given by arL. If firms can provide information costlessly to individuals,
then providing them warning information will always be advantageous if con-
sumers have some perception of the risk, and will be a break-even proposi-
tion if consumers' risk perceptions are zero.
39 112 S Ct at 2637.
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providing the government-mandated warning fulfills the firm's infor-
mational obligation, plaintiffs will not be able to sue the firm for inade-
quate warnings, but they will be able to sue on the basis of design
defects, failure to meet obligations with respect to product-related risk
research, and other matters. However, the firm can be confident that at
least with respect to provision of hazard warnings it has met its obliga-
tions. Moreover, to the extent that these warnings inform consumers of
the risks associated with the product, then the resulting consumer deci-
sions will be sound and one can be confident that market outcomes will
reflect efficient risk-taking behavior.
In contrast, under the Cipollone majority's rule, the firm's warn-
ings can still be found to be inadequate. Plaintiffs' warnings experts
routinely testify that if the print size had been bolder, the warning had
been more prominent, or additional warning language had been
included, then the risky activity would have been avoided.
To avoid the possibility of such suits, there will be an incentive for
the firm to augment the warning language even if the mandated warn-
ing provides the proper amount of information. In the case of mass
produced products, such as cigarettes, where an inadequate warnings
decision has broad ramifications across an entire product line, the
incentives for overwarning will be substantial. To the extent that the
additional risk of liability leads to excessive warning, the effect will not
only be to distort the risk information conveyed about the particular
product but also perhaps to possibly dilute the warnings for other
products as well. In effect, this product will be stamped as being more
hazardous than it actually is, thus leading consumers to have a dis-
torted perspective of its risk relative to other products.
Moreover, as consumers learn from experience and from other
sources the true risk, and see that the provided warnings have over-
stated this risk, they will tend to discount warnings. This would be an
undesirable consequence of overwarning the consumers.
The use of additional warning language to augment the mandated
warning also may create problems with respect to risk communication
for that particular warning. As risk information on the label increases,
there are problems of label clutter as individuals' cognitive limitations
impede their abilities to process a substantial amount of information.
There is also the danger that the additional information will undercut
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the impact of the succinct hazard warning mandated by the govern-
ment. Moreover, any additional information that is provided by the
firm will not be within the context of a standardized warnings vocabu-
lary. One of the advantages of federally mandated warnings is that the
warning content is standardized across the product group. The warn-
ings context is one situation where standardization is often preferable
since it increases individuals' ability to make reliable judgments
regarding the product's risk level.
The final difficulty of facing additional liability with respect to
warnings is that firms in effect have no safe harbor. Unable to fulfill its
legal obligations by adopting the government-mandated warning, the
firm will remain uncertain as to the future liability with respect to the
product. This uncertainty leads to a variety of distortions, not only with
respect to product warnings but also with respect to discouraging
innovation of new products and the production of risky products more
generally.
D. Summary
Although the two dissenting Justices provided an analysis of the
1965 statute that is economically superior to that adopted by the other
seven Justices, the actual effect of this portion of the decision will be
relatively minor. The 1965 statute was subjected to superseding
amendments in 1969, and the amended version has been in effect since
that time. Because there was no preemptive federal legislation at all
before the 1965 statute was enacted, the unduly narrow interpretation
of the preemptive effect of the law that affects conduct that occurred
for about four years in the relatively distant past will have only trivial
incentive effects. It is the interpretation of the 1969 statute that is really
significant, and to that subject I now turn.
V Two ERRORS IN APPLYING
THE 1969 CIGARETTE WARNINGS STATUTE
In the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Congress
amended the hazard warning language to indicate that "smoking is
hazardous" instead of the somewhat more conditional "smoking may
be hazardous" claim, as is indicated in Table 4 above. Although this
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statement is more direct, it is attributed to the Surgeon General rather
than being an unconditional statement by the government.40
The fundamental issue with respect to the 1969 labeling statute
was not the change in the wording of the warning but rather the modifi-
cation in the preemption provision. The original § 5(b) was replaced by
the following:
(b) No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and
health shall be imposed under State law with respect to the advertis-
ing or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled
in conformity with the provisions of the Act.
Whether this statement broadened the preemptive effect of the
cigarette warning legislation beyond that of the 1965 Act was the most
significant and divisive issue addressed by the Court. On this issue the
Court split into three distinct camps. Justice Blackmun, writing for
himself and two others, concluded that the preemptive effect of the
reworded 1969 provision was no greater than that of the 1965 statute.
His legal reasoning was based primarily on a very strong presumption
against preemption, manifested in a demand that Congress articulate
any preemptive intent with the utmost clarity and absence of ambigu-
ity. At the other extreme from this "clear statement" rule, Justice Scalia
(joined by one other Justice) urged that the language of the preemption
provision simply be given its ordinary and apparent meaning. In Sca-
lia's view, this interpretation required the preemption of all the claims
in this case because they all invoke duties "based on smoking or
health."
Whatever the merits of these contending positions may be as a
matter of legal doctrine and application of precedent, each is economi-
cally flawed. This is most clear in the case of Blackmun's position,
which distorts the incentives that the federal labeling requirement
should create by allowing state laws to require additional and poten-
tially higher-cost risk communication tools. As noted earlier, Justice
Blackmun purports to offer an answer to this economic objection, but
40 Survey test results regarding a similar warning for products other than
cigarettes suggests that the change in the warning in 1969 did not necessarily
strengthen the impact that the warning had on consumer risk perceptions.
See the particular results reported in Viscusi, Smoking at 33 (cited in note
11).
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his defense fails because it requires one either to ignore the importance
of the incentive effects that are manifestly a principal purpose of the
federal statute, or to ignore the fundamental desirability of lower-cost
risk communication techniques.
Justice Scalia's opinion avoids this error, but goes too far in the
other direction by failing to distinguish the treatment of company deci-
sions relating to hazard communication and those decisions that may
be quite independent of the hazard warning costs. The fact that firms
are required to have in place specific product warnings should, for ex-
ample, in no way impede their ability to perform product-related risk
research or invest in safer product designs. It will be true, of course,
that the mandated warnings will apprise consumers of the risks. How-
ever, this risk communication effort will be based on the current state
of knowledge. In situations where our knowledge of the risk is evolving
and can potentially be altered by continuing to engage in research and,
in some instances, bringing to bear more recent technologies on this
research effort, then it will clearly be desirable to maintain appropriate
incentives for firms to refine our knowledge of the risk. This knowledge
in turn may lead to different warning requirements in the future.
Company research is particularly important to the extent that
there are particular nontobacco ingredients added to the company's
cigarettes that have uncertain risk implications. For ingredients shared
by cigarettes of many companies, such as tobacco, a more efficient
research approach research would be to tax cigarette companies to
support a centralized federal research effort. Moreover, the govern-
ment could also undertake a leadership role in terms of assessing risk
levels for cigarettes and providing guidelines for firms to communicate
these risks to consumers. However, even though federal intervention
may be more efficient, this does not necessarily eliminate the responsi-
bility of firms to take such actions in the absence of federal involve-
ment.
Another way to view the role of effective warnings is the following.
An adequate warning will apprise consumers of the risk and, as a
result, one can be confident that the resulting decisions with respect to
purchase of the product will be efficient. Consumers will derive a
higher level of expected welfare from purchasing the product than from
not purchasing, based on the true risks associated with the product. In
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these situations, the firm should not be subject to liability with respect
to the overall marketability of the product.
However, this efficiency result does not imply that the firm should
be free of liabilitywith respect to changes in product design. If consum-
ers were also fully informed of the risks associated with alternative
product designs, then market processes would provide incentives for
the provisions of products with an efficient level of safety, and consum-
ers would select the level of safety that is most in line with their prefer-
ences. However, if the new product designs are not on the market and
there is no accompanying risk information effort to provide informa-
tion to consumers to generate a demand for these safer products, then
one cannot necessarily conclude that market processes will generate
efficient risk outcomes simply because the hazardous products now on
the market bear an appropriate warning.
Indeed the government has long been an impediment to the gener-
ation of risk information that would provide the impetus for design
change.41 In the 1960s, the government discouraged the "great tar
derby" in which cigarette companies attempted to compete with each
other in terms of lowered tar and nicotine levels. More recently, the
government has discouraged both the smokeless cigarette marketed by
R.J. Reynolds and the de-nicotined cigarette marketed by Phillip Mor-
ris, as the policy emphasis has been to oppose smoking irrespective of
the degree of safety associated with particular kinds of cigarettes. To
enable consumers to select from an efficient mix of product designs as
opposed to making a correct dichotomous decision between smoking
cigarettes now on the market and not smoking, the government should
foster additional risk information with respect to alternative product
designs to promote market competition with respect to safety. Current
policies suppress this information, and the net effect is that consumers
now rarely distinguish between the risks posed by differing kinds of
cigarettes.42
41 See Viscusi, Smoking chapter 7 (cited in note 11).
42 For further discussion of this issue and the government's policies in this
area, see id.
HeinOnline  -- 3 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 270 1993
W I VIscusI
VI. THE STEVENS INTERPRErATION OF THE 1969 SAaruTE
In his plurality opinion for four Justices, John Paul Stevens inter-
preted the 1969 statute to preempt some claims but not others. An
examination of his conclusions shows that he arrived at the economi-
cally correct result in each instance, although his explanations for those
results did not display much in the way of economic reasoning.
In contrast to Stevens' analysis of the 1965 statute, but in accord
with Scalia's interpretation of both statutes, Stevens concluded that
the 1969 statute preempts failure to warn claims that presuppose a
duty on the part of manufacturers to include in their advertising or pro-
motional materials warnings other than those required by the federal
statute. Unlike Justice Scalia, however, Stevens correctly concludes
that this rule of preemption should not extend to claims based on
alleged deficiencies in the manufacturers' testing or research practices.
For the reasons I gave in the previous section of this article, such pre-
emption would be economically inappropriate. Although he drew the
correct conclusion, Stevens did not explain the underlying economic
rationale.
The plurality also concluded that claims for breach of an express
warranty were not preempted by the 1969 Act. Since this issue does not
hinge upon the adequacy of the firm's hazard communication efforts
but rather on whether the firm made some kind of promise to the buyer
regarding the product that was purchased, there is no economic ratio-
nale for preempting this claim. As Justice Stevens correctly observes:
If, for example, a manufacturer expressly promised to pay a smok-
er's medical bills if she contracted emphysema, the duty to honor
that promise could not fairly be said tobe 'imposed under state law,'
but rather is best understood as undertaken by the manufacturer
itself.43
With respect to fraudulent misrepresentation, the petitioners had
two theories. The first suggested that advertising served to neutralize
the effect of the hazard warning labels by depicting the product favor-
43 In this regard I take a somewhat different view from Justice Scalia, who
maintains that the warnings also preempt warranties since "every express
warranty obligation is a 'requirement... imposed under State law,' and that,
therefore, the Act preempts petitioners' expressed warranty claim." 112 S
Ct at 2622.
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ably. Justice Stevens correctly concluded that claims based on this
theory are preempted. If the firm were to undertake some other explicit
risk communication effort that explicitly disavowed the hazard warn-
ing, then this type of advertising certainly might be considered fraudu-
lent misrepresentation. However, the hazard warning regulation was
imposed in a context where it is understood that the firm would be able
to undertake its normal business operations with respect to marketing.
Depicting consumers of its products as being attractive and happy in
their consumption decision is certainly not atypical marketing prac-
tice. If the intent of advertising is to sell a product, one wonders why
firms would ever depict their consumers as being physically unattrac-
tive and dissatisfied with the product. Since this claim in no way sug-
gests that the firm's actions changed to undercut the efficacy of the
warning, there is no economic basis for it. The hazard warnings
requirement is designed within the context of the current business
environment, not under the assumption that all other actions under-
taken by the firm and by the government are going to be changed in a
manner that will boost risk perceptions even further.
The second fraudulent misrepresentation theory suggested that
the defendants falsely represented and concealed material facts con-
cerning the risks of smoking. The Stevens plurality correctly concluded
that specific fraudulent statements are not preempted by the 1969 Act.
Although Stevens did not address this issue openly, the main matter of
concern from an economic standpoint is the implication of these state-
ments for consumer behavior. If consumers dismiss these statements
altogether or if they do not alter their risk perceptions in a manner that
is sufficient to lead them to make inefficient choices with respect to this
risky product, then there is no efficiency loss associated with even
fraudulent misrepresentation and no rationale for finding the defen-
dants liable. Thus, the principal economic test for fraudulent misrep-
resentation should be the consequences of the falsity and the ultimate
implications for market efficiency rather than the existence of a falsity.
In the extreme case in which false statements are made and no actions
are altered because of them, there are no economic losses involved and
no rationale for damages. Because state law presumably requires proof
of causation, however, this possibility would not justify preemption.
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The final theory that was offered pertained to conspiracy to mis-
represent or conceal material facts. For the same reasons given in the
plurality's discussion of intentional fraud, this claim was not pre-
empted by the provisions of the 1969 Act. Although I agree with the
conclusion in this instance and in the situation of intentional fraud,
once again the main issue is not simply whether there was conspiracy
but whether this conspiracy was of economic consequence. The ulti-
mate question is not whether fraudulent statements were made or facts
were concealed, but rather whether these falsehoods substantially
altered the perceived product risk and the decisions based on these
beliefs.
It should also be stressed, however, that there is a strong case for
the economic provision of true information, particularly on the part of
large manufacturers. Information by nature is a public good for which
the costs of transmitting the information to multiple parties instead of
one are low if not zero. Moreover, there are often substantial econo-
mies of scale for information acquisition and generation so that large
producers of a product have an economic advantage in generating this
information over decentralized consumers. One would certainly want
to maintain economic incentives for the provision of accurate informa-
tion. However, the ultimate value of the information should be judged
on the basis of the extent to which the information will alter probabilis-
tic beliefs and individual decisions. One of the most fundamental
results in the economics of information is that information that does
not alter decisions has zero value to the decision maker. This same
insight should be adopted by the courts in this instance by shifting
attention to the rationality of the product choices that result.
Justice Stevens' success in arriving at economically justifiable
conclusions, without having offered much in the way of economic
explanation, is particularly striking in light of the severe criticisms to
which his approach was subjected by Blackmun and Scalia alike. The
essence of their attack was that Stevens was inconsistent in his treat-
ment of the failure to warn and fraudulent misrepresentation claims.
Both Blackmun and Scalia argued that both types of claims are identi-
cal in the sense that they must be based either on "smoking or health"
(as Scalia concluded) or on a more general duty to inform consumers of
known risks (as Blackmun concluded). Explicitly rejecting the "theo-
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retical elegance" that he acknowledged was offered by the Blackmun
and Scalia proposals, Stevens defended the inconsistency in his own
position as a faithful reflection of what he called "congressional
purpose. '44
As Blackmun and Scalia convincingly demonstrated, however, the
intent attributed to Congress by Stevens was by no means clearly
expressed. This leads me to suspect that the real key to understanding
Justice Stevens' opinion is an unstated attribution of economic ratio-
nality to the 1969 Congress. And because Stevens did not find the same
economically defensible intent in the less important 1965 statute,
perhaps what we are seeing here is the operation, certainly unstated
and perhaps unconscious, of rational economic policy choices by the
Stevens' plurality. It would certainly make some sense, after all, for a
group of Justices who were tacitly incorporating economic policy judg-
ments into their interpretation of statutory law to limit such activism to
the most economically important context.
This is, of course, only speculation on my part, but if true it would
explain what are otherwise some puzzling aspects of the Cipollone deci-
sion. In any event, and even apart from these speculations, the
approach of the Stevens plurality seems more likely than either of the
other two approaches to become the favored approach in the future.
Lower courts are more likely to treat the opinion of a four-Justice plu-
rality as the governing law than they are to follow either of the
approaches that attracted fewer votes in the Supreme Court. That, I
think, is good news from an economist's perspective.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Cipollone decision is likely to be regarded as a disappoint-
ment by many lawyers, who will naturally be concerned at the absence
of a majority opinion stating and applying the law of preemption.
Looked at from an economic perspective, however, in which the main
concern is whether efficient market operations are encouraged by the
legal rules adopted in the case, there is more reason to be pleased than
disappointed.
Cases arising from conduct that occurred before the effective date
of the 1965 statute are not affected by the Cipollone decision, but this is
44 112 S Ct at 2624 n 27.
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of minor and decreasing practical significance because the signifi-
cance of smoking that took place more than a quarter century ago is
increasingly unlikely to be the cause of illnesses or injuries that mani-
fest themselves today. For the same reason, the Cipollone Court's inter-
pretation of the 1965 statute, though unfortunate, should have only
very limited continuing effect. Even more important, the incentives
determining the future behavior of cigarette manufacturers will be
affected almost exclusively by the Court's interpretation of the 1969
Act because it is that statute's preemption provision that remains in
effect today.
With respect to the issues most important in immediate practical
terms -namely those arising from the 1969 statute-the Cipollone case
was resolved in a way that will best promote economic efficiency. An
economist may be disappointed in the paucity of proper economic
analysis in the Court's various opinions, but consumer welfare will not
be affected by this shortcoming.
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